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IN MY VIEW
“THE MYTH OF AN ISOLATED SCENARIO”
Sir:
In his “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” in the Summer 2008 issue of Naval
War College Review, Professor William Murray argues that in a complete sur-
prise scenario, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could launch a long-range
precision bombardment to quickly cripple or destroy the Republic of China
(ROC) navy and air force; the subsequent invasion and blockade by the PLA
could then neutralize the island republic’s resistance on the ground and achieve
success before the United States could intervene. Accordingly, Murray suggested
that Taiwan should not heavily invest in its navy and air force because neither is
likely to survive such a surprise attack; rather, it should adopt a “porcupine strat-
egy” and “concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed
with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons.” He believes that such a policy
would enable Taiwan to resist the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) offense
for weeks or even months and allow the United States time to deliberate whether
intervention is warranted.
The article hinges upon the scenario of a “complete surprise.” In reality, how-
ever, this scenario is selectively isolated and hardly tenable. First of all, in an en-
visioned campaign across the Taiwan Strait, the PLA would never base its
invasion on guided missiles alone. Before it launches a long-range precision
bombardment with its overwhelming guided missiles, the PLA will conduct an
access-denial strategy in advance, deploying its numerous submarines between
the first and the second island chains so as to prevent the intervention of the U.S.
Navy. At the same time, the PLA will assemble a huge number of combat troops
of the three services along the southeast coast for subsequent invasion and
blockade. At this juncture, the numerous advanced spy and reconnaissance sat-
ellites of the United States will come into play and prove themselves. Although
the PLA has antisatellite missiles, it is impossible for the PLA to eliminate all
such U.S. satellites instantaneously. That is, the deployment of numerous
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submarines and the assembly of vast numbers of PLA combat troops will defi-
nitely be picked up by the U.S. satellites, which will then provide strategic and
tactical warnings to the United States and Taiwan. A Western proverb goes as fol-
lows: forewarned is forearmed. Once alerted, the United States and Taiwan will
respond accordingly. Consequently, there is no room for a “complete surprise”
to occur across the Taiwan Strait realistically. In short, a critical but implicit as-
sumption of the “complete surprise” scenario—the PLA conducts vital deploy-
ment without being detected—is untenable at all. This makes the article
fundamentally flawed.
The argument that neither the Taiwan navy and air force is likely to survive
such a long-range precision bombardment is also seriously flawed. At present,
the ROC navy has two operational Dutch-built submarines. If the ROC acquired
the additional eight submarines which the Bush administration has promised to
sell to Taiwan in 2001, its navy would have altogether ten operational subma-
rines. As prescribed by naval routine, at least three or four submarines would be
cruising under the sea. All ten would be ready for combat once the PLA’s critical
deployment was detected. These submarines cruising under the sea stand the
best chance to survive a dozen waves of saturation missiles attack by the PLA and
would be immediately ready for lethal revenge attacks. Their counterattack
might neutralize more than a third of the invading amphibious troops during
the shore-to-shore maneuver stage and force the PLA to abort its invasion.
Even though the PLA may still conduct a blockade against Taiwan, the fact
that the island sits on the chokepoint of quite a few vital sea-lanes may trigger in-
ternational intervention right away. The international pressure may well soon
exceed the level Beijing could withstand. A prolonged blockade will prove an in-
vitation to international intervention and may end up in failure. In short, the co-
herence of the scenario from a long-range precision bombardment to blockade
is fragile.
The so-called porcupine strategy puts emphasis on the conservation of army
forces rather than the building up of the navy and the air force of the ROC. This
strategy might lead to a disastrous result. When in power, both the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) have claimed that Taiwan
is a maritime nation. Hence the ROC is meant to be a sea power. As shown by the
example of the United States, the U.K., and Japan, a sea power has to prioritize
the buildup of its navy and air force. Otherwise, it is giving up the struggle for sea
and air control. As an island republic, Taiwan would be vulnerable to external
threat without a strong navy and air force. Neglecting to build up its navy and air
force would invite PLA invasion.
If the PLA chose to invade Taiwan, it would very likely adopt an “access de-
nial” strategy against the U.S. beforehand. That is, before invading Taiwan, the
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PLA could establish a line, or even a double line, of defense, composed of sub-
marines, between the first and the second island chains. If the PLA succeeds in
taking Taiwan, how long would it take the U.S. to break through the formidable
line(s) of defense to come to the rescue of Taiwan? If the PLA heavily reinforced
its combat troops and consolidated its anti-U.S. defenses right after taking Tai-
wan, the breakthrough and rescue operations of the United States would be fur-
ther delayed. The longer the delay, the heavier the casualties for the United States
and the dimmer the chance of success. Facing the grim prospect of a miserable
war, heavy casualties, and prolonged confrontation with the formidable PRC,
will the U.S. Congress approve the dispatch of its soldiers to sacrifice their lives
for Taiwan, already in the firm grip of the PLA? Probably very few would be
optimistic about the answer.
If, then, the ROC government adopts the “porcupine strategy” and ignores
the buildup of its navy and air force, the PLA might be lured to take up an
access-denial strategy against the U.S. and launch a surprise attack against the
island simultaneously. Whatever the result of the PLA attack would be, it would
be a disaster for Taiwan. This kind advice from a friend might lead to catastro-
phe. The ROC government has to be careful with the “porcupine strategy.”
Professor Murray argues that facing the overwhelming military threat from
the PLA, Taiwan must rethink and redesign an asymmetrical defense strategy to
deny the PRC’s strategic objectives. There is more than one option in terms of
asymmetric defense strategy. Stressing the conservation of army combat power
is one option. Putting emphasis on the buildup of the navy and air force in a way
that yields strategic deterrence capacity, tenacious survival ability, and lethal re-
venge capability could be another. An asymmetric army can make [it hard for]
the PLA to swallow the island, while an asymmetric navy and air force may dis-
suade it from launching a surprise attack in the first place. It is not difficult to tell
which is superior.
Confronting the overwhelming superiority, and likelihood, of surprise attack
from the PLA, the ROC military should aim to promote survivability, revenge
capability, strategic deterrence, and asymmetric-warfare capabilities. In terms
of tangible options, the decision makers in Taipei and Washington, D.C., have to
abandon tribalism and answer the following question honestly: In a scenario
close to a complete surprise, is there any war-fighting platform that possesses
survivability, revenge capability, strategic deterrence, and asymmetric-warfare
capabilities superior to those of submarines? Actually, if the ROC has acquired
substantial submarines, the high survivability and fatal revenge capability of
submarines alone might dissuade the PLA from invading Taiwan in the first
place.
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The “porcupine strategy” urges that the combat-power-conservation mea-
sures of the army be consolidated so that Taiwan can resist PLA invasion long
enough for America to come to the rescue. The strategy serves the interests of the
United States. The argument expects the ROC to hold on and defend the critical
strategic point of the first island chain for the U.S. However, the ROC is not a
vassal state of America; rather, it is an independent maritime nation. It has its
own national goals to accomplish, including safeguarding the territorial integ-
rity and maritime resources of the Senkaku Islands and the islands in the South
China Sea.
Many of the Asia-Pacific nations are pursuing naval buildup programs. The
ROC has territorial disputes with some of these nations. Such disputes involve
conventional security threats, and military power still plays a significant role for
resolution. Taiwan has to face the solemn issue of safeguarding the territorial in-
tegrity and maritime resources with military power, if necessary. The ROC sim-
ply cannot entrust the mission to any other country. As other Asia-Pacific
nations pursue military buildups, if we do not, shall we take the mindset of a
protectorate and look to the U.S. or some other big brother for protection? Such
mentality is dangerous and irresponsible. As an independent island republic,
Taiwan has to rely on its navy and air force to ensure the integrity of its territorial
sovereignty and maritime resources.
“Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy” shows concern about the security of
Taiwan. The scenario and suggestions it offers serve to help the ROC review its
vulnerability and look for ways for improvements; therefore, the writing as a
whole merits approbation from Taiwan. However, the paper is fundamentally
flawed. The basic assumption of the scenario of complete surprise is untenable;
the coherence of the scenario is fragile. The article has been, in effect, developed
in the interests of the U.S. and subconsciously treats the ROC as a vassal state
and a protectorate of America, which contradicts our commitment to Taiwan as
a sovereign maritime nation. The suggestions given by the article may further
deprive Taiwan of its aspiration to become a sea power. The ROC military, on the
one hand, appreciates the paper’s concern but, on the other hand, is cautious
about its suggestions.
WEN-LUNG LAURENCE LIN
National Defense University, Taiwan
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Sir:
William S. Murray wrote an intriguing, thoughtful article arguing that both Tai-
pei and Washington needed to reexamine the island’s approach to defending
against an attack from the People’s Republic of China. Entitled “Revisiting Tai-
wan’s Defense Strategy,” Mr. Murray’s article contends that the pace and scope of
China’s military modernization—with its rapid introduction of precise
short-range ballistic missiles, advanced submarines, surface ships, aircraft and
surface-to-air missiles—has “fundamentally altered” the cross-strait security
environment by eroding Taiwan’s strategic depth and geographic advantage.
Mr. Murray concludes that Taiwan should forgo purchasing advanced mili-
tary systems from the U.S. and stop developing its own offensive counterstrike
capabilities. Taiwan instead should adopt a “porcupine strategy” by hardening
its civil-military infrastructure and strengthening the Taiwan army to such an
extent that Taipei would deny Beijing all of its strategic objectives in attacking
the island. In short, he believes that this new strategy would show “demonstrable
Taiwanese resilience[,] would diminish Beijing’s prior confidence in success,
strengthen cross-strait deterrence, and reduce the risk of the United States being
dragged into a conflict with China.”
Professor Murray’s analysis of the relative PRC and Taiwan military capabili-
ties and strategies during a full-scale conflict is largely sound. However, his con-
clusion that Taiwan is doing enough but just “not doing the right things” misses
some important strategic considerations. The right thing for Taipei to do now is
to ensure that its defense policy is free from partisan politics and that Taiwan
fully utilizes its acquired weapon systems toward a viable defense against
Beijing’s threats.
Taiwan’s acquisition of the recently announced $6.4 billion package (which
includes Harpoon missiles, PAC-3 missiles and firing units, AH-64D Apache he-
licopters, and upgrades for Taiwan’s E-2 early warning aircraft) will serve as an-
other step toward maintaining a capable and resilient defense force. Moreover,
Taiwan’s purchase is also an important symbol of Taipei’s resolve to resist
Beijing’s coercion—a far more powerful symbol than Taiwan deploying offen-
sive missiles or “hardening” alone. Despite limitations at the higher end of the
escalation ladder, Taiwan’s military capabilities play a central role in preventing
Beijing from intimidating the island (via force demonstrations, forward exer-
cises, sea-lane disruptions, etc.) so as to force Taipei to negotiate under duress.
By Taiwan’s maintaining a modestly sized but potent force equipped with ad-
vanced weaponry, its military will have the capacity to confront these intimida-
tions successfully and confidently. Faced with this resistance, Beijing will then
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need to either deescalate the situation or make the risky, costly choice China
does not want to make: full-scale war.
In the face of overwhelming Chinese force, however, a strong Taiwan military
is a necessary—but not sufficient—requirement for the island’s defense. Re-
gardless of how “hardened” Taiwan becomes, it is unlikely that Taipei could re-
sist a prolonged, full-scale assault alone—a point Murray readily concedes.
What complicates Beijing’s calculus—and therefore prevents China from un-
dertaking such a gambit—is the risk of failure, a hazard made far greater by the
prospect of U.S. intervention that reinforces the island’s will to resist. Therefore,
Washington’s promise to keep Taiwan safe from attack and intimidation by, in
part, providing it appropriate defense articles and services is indispensable for
maintaining security and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The sale of defense
systems like PAC-3 and AH-64D Apache helicopters is a significant, tangible,
and responsible demonstration of Washington’s long-standing commitment to
Taipei, succinctly enunciated in President Bush’s pledge to “do whatever it takes
to defend Taiwan.”
Professor Murray is correct that it is important for the U.S. and Taiwan to re-
evaluate periodically the direction of their defense policies to ensure that they
are consistent with the changing security environment. His prescription that
Taiwan’s leaders should work to reduce its critical vulnerabilities is a sound one.
Making improvements in Taiwan’s civil-military infrastructure is especially im-
portant for an island prone to periodic natural disasters. So too is improving the
Taiwan army’s sustainability, training, and force protection.
Now, however, is not the time for Taiwan to abandon the primary features of
its current defense strategy in favor of Professor Murray’s “porcupine strat-
egy”—a radical form of Taiwan’s previous “resolute defense, effective deter-
rence” doctrine. Instead, Taipei should look to develop all of its armed services
in ways that accentuate the geographic advantages the island continues to enjoy
despite Beijing’s improved capacity to coerce and intimidate. These may include
a more robust use of sophisticated decoys, wider use of alternative runways and
basing, or employing more redundant and joint logistics infrastructure as Mr.
Murray suggests. Nevertheless, these efforts should complement Taipei’s current
strategy, not replace it.
With the announcement now made in Washington, the hard part begins for
Taipei. It is incumbent on Taiwan’s authorities to provide the sufficient funding
to procure the $6.4 billion package in the near term and to prepare its forces to
employ them effectively over the long term. Taiwan’s political parties now need
to cooperate on their defensive needs and avoid politicizing defense policy. A
clear, long-range defense strategy that transcends party politics would best serve
the island’s security in the long term. Failing to do so will undermine
1 3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 2, Art. 19
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss2/19
Washington and Taipei’s efforts to maintain cross-strait security and stability as
Beijing continues its rapid military modernization unabated.
MICHAEL CASSIDY
Analyst, U.S. Department of Defense
Professor Murray replies:
In his summary of my argument, and repeatedly in his subsequent analysis, Cap-
tain Lin claims that I advocate the negligence of Taiwan’s air force and navy, and
the buildup of its army in their place. This is incorrect. The complete sentence
from which he quoted (italicized portion) reads: “Rather than relying on its
navy and air force (neither of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy
an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional
standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons.” Maritime
powers, as Captain Lin rightly observes, have real needs for the capabilities an air
force and navy can provide. Taiwan is no exception. I don’t, however, think it is
prudent to count on either Taiwan’s navy or air force to apply combat power ef-
fectively after being subjected to a surprise bombardment. Consequently, it
would seem logical (and not parochial) to rely more heavily on a fully profes-
sional, properly equipped and trained army as an effective counter-invasion
force. This does not mandate or constitute a recommendation for the diminish-
ment or disestablishment of either the Taiwan navy or air force, but it does sug-
gest the need to rethink the missions they should be configured to perform.
Mr. Cassidy wrote that I feel “Taiwan should forgo purchasing advanced mili-
tary systems from the U.S.” This is a misleading oversimplification of my argu-
ment. I contend instead that weapons systems offered by the United States
should be unambiguously defensive; that they should be able to survive an ini-
tial bombardment by large numbers of precision munitions; and that they
should directly assist in either defeating an invasion or preserving Taipei’s abil-
ity to prevent Beijing from obtaining control over the island’s airspace and adja-
cent waters. Weapons that satisfy these criteria can be simple or advanced, but
there are undeniable advantages to relatively simple weapons systems if they are
used in a manner that achieves a set of coherent strategic objectives.
I N M Y V I E W 1 3 5
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Captain Lin bases a significant portion of his counterarguments on the as-
sumption that Taiwan will receive strategic and tactical warning. I agree that
Taiwan should be able to discern strategic warning. Intelligence specialists
can better assess than I whether China can launch barrages of missiles
against Taiwan without providing unambiguous indicators of imminent at-
tack. Nonetheless, I would imagine the benefits of being able to do so are
readily apparent to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and that China’s
military has trained to be able to do just that. I think it is also reasonable to
assume that Beijing’s operational plans are designed and sequenced to mini-
mize the likelihood of providing Taipei tactical warning. The alternative
seems like a poor planning assumption and ignores the PLA’s history of
achieving tactical surprise. I’ll also observe that Taiwan’s runways and other
valuable fixed facilities and weapons systems remain vulnerable regardless of
the amount or type of warning received.
Captain Lin argues that Taiwan’s potential future submarines will survive a
Chinese bombardment and deter or defeat an invasion. I agree that correctly po-
sitioned submarines could probably sink several invading amphibious ships
near Chinese ports of departure or as they transit to an invasion beach. Yet even
a fortuitously positioned four-knot submarine will have limited attack opportu-
nities against a fleet of twelve-knot amphibious ships and escorts. I do not un-
derstand how Taiwan could ensure these opportunities unless several of Taipei’s
submarines continuously patrolled in the very shallow waters near likely land-
ing beaches or immediately outside the similarly shallow waters of Chinese
ships’ home ports (which would likely be defensively mined). Captain Lin wrote
that Taiwan could maintain three or four submarines in such positions, but this
assertion represents a very high submarine force operations tempo. Such a high
OPTEMPO would likely require an even larger inventory of submarines than
that to which Taiwan currently aspires. Regardless, China could defeat such a
concept of operations by building more amphibious ships than Taiwan’s
submarines could be expected to sink.
Mr. Cassidy notes that Taiwan’s weapons systems are important symbols of
Taipei’s resolve and that those systems would help the island resist coercion in
scenarios less severe than the existentially threatening example I posited. I agree.
Yet I remain concerned that many of Taiwan’s showcase weapons systems could
be destroyed or rendered unusable by an initial Chinese salvo of conventional
missiles. Symbolism based on vulnerable weapons systems is not a feature of an
effective deterrent and does little to lend stability to a crisis. For these reasons I
must disagree with Mr. Cassidy’s assertion that “Now . . . is not the time for Tai-
wan to abandon the primary features of its current defense strategy.” On the
contrary, I think Taiwan should, as a matter of urgency, honestly and openly
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debate its strategic options and determine how to reestablish a stable deterrence.
The United States should actively contribute to this debate.
Mr. Cassidy recommends that Taipei should ensure that its defense policy is
freed from partisan politics. I wonder if this is possible (since it doesn’t appear to
be in other democracies), yet I take his point. Taiwan’s defenses and defensive
strategy largely stagnated during the tumultuous years of the Chen administra-
tion, partly due to partisan politics. Simultaneously, China aggressively mod-
ernized its military and fundamentally altered how it could apply coercive force
against Taiwan and against any intervening forces. This created a worrisome and
deepening imbalance in what had been a relatively stable situation. I believe
there is a compelling need to reevaluate and reconsider what constitutes an ef-
fective defense strategy for Taiwan and how the United States should best sup-
port it. Toward that end, I have offered the ideas in the “porcupine strategy,” and
I maintain that they make sense, both for Taiwan and for the United States.
Finally, I am gratified by Captain Lin’s statement that my paper “Revisiting
Taiwan’s Defense Strategy” offers the potential to help Taiwan in some way. I am
sure he, Mr. Cassidy, and I would agree that continued deterrence across the
Strait is in everyone’s interest, even though we don’t yet agree on how that deter-
rence can best be maintained.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY
Naval War College
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